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Claims for Services, Attendance and
Support Against Decedents' Estates
In the February, 1924, Number of the Dickinson Law
Review appears an excellent article by Professor Reese on
a timely topic: "Quasi Contractual Recovery for Work and
Labor; Effect of Family Relation".
The present discussion basicly covers the same ground
but is devoted particularly to a discussion of that rather
numerous class of cases in the Pennsylvania Reports in-
volving the administration of the estates of the dead. In
most cases the questions arise in the distribution of such
estates through decrees of our Orphans' Courts but occa-
sionally the same problems are presented in actions in as-
sumpsit in the Common Pleas brought by plaintiffs against
administrators or executors of decedents.
In Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. 465, 1857, assumpsit was
brought by a son against the estate of his father for com-
pensation for services rendered the latter in his lifetime.
After the plaintiff had attained his majority he continued to
reside with his father on the home farm and to labor for
him; which arrangement, with the exception of one year
of absence in Virginia, continued for a period of seventeen
years, when the plaintiff married and brought his wife to
his father's home where they all continued to reside. Later
the father put the son on another farm which he owned
and sometime afterwards the father and mother moved into
these same premises with the son and continued to reside
there until the death of the father. The labor of the son
was extended over a period, continuous, with the exception
of one year, for twenty-four years. The jury having found
a verdict for the plaintiff upon which judgment was en-
tered, the case came to the Supreme Court on a writ of
error. The question was whether the law would presume
a contract of hiring in the absence of express evidence.
Lowrie, J., discusses the different classes of contracts. Re-
ferring to the language of Blackstone in 2 Comm. 443, and
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characterizing the language as indicating "some looseness
of thought", the learned Justice declares:
"All true contracts grow out of the intentions of
the parties to transactions, and are dictated only by
their mutual and accordant wills".
Recurring to the Blackstonian law, later on the learned
Justice says:
"But it appears in another place, 3 Comm. 159-166,
that Blackstone introduces this thought about reason
and justice dictating contracts, in order to embrace,
under his definition of an implied contract, another
large class of relations, which involve no intention to
contract at all, though they may be treated as if they
did. Thus, whenever, not our variant notions of reason
and justice, but the common sense and common justice
of the country, and therefore the common law or
statute law, impose upon any one a duty, irrespective
of contract, and allow it to be enforced by a contract
remedy, he calls this a case of implied contract. Thus
out of torts grows the duty of compensation, and in
many cases the tort may be waived, and the action
brought in assumpsit. It is quite apparent, therefore,
that radically different relations are classified under the
same term, and this must often give rise to indistinct-
ness of thought. And this was not at all necessary;
for we have another well-authorized technical term
exactly adapted to the office of making the true dis-
tinction. The latter class are merely constructive con-
tracts, while the former are truly implied ones. In one
case the contract is mere fiction, a form imposed in
order to adapt the case to a given remedy; in the other
it is a fact legitimately inferred. In one, the intention
is disregarded; in the other, it is ascertained and en-
forced. In one, the duty defines the contract; in the
other, the contract defines the duty.
We have, therefore, in law, three classes of rela-
tions called contracts.
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1. Constructive contracts, which are fictions of
law adapted to enforce legal duties by actions of con-
tract, where no proper contract exists, express or im-
plied.
2. Implied contracts, which arise under circum-
stances which, according to the ordinary course of
dealing and the common understanding of men, show
a mutual intention to contract.
3. Express contracts, already sufficiently distin-
guished.
In the present case there is no pretence of a con-
structive contract, but only as a proper one, either ex-
press or implied. And it is scarcely insisted that the
law would imply one in such a case as this; yet we may
present the principle of the case the more clearly, by
showing why it is not one of implied contract.
The law ordinarily presumes or implies a contract
whenever this is necessary to account for other rela-
tions found to have existed between the parties.
Thus if a man is found to have done work for an-
other, and there appears no known relation between
them that accounts for such service, the law presumes
a contract of hiring. But if a man's house takes fire,
the law does not presume or imply a contract to pay
his neighbours for their services in saving his property.
The common principles of human conduct mark self-
interest as the motive of action in the one case, and
kindness in the other; and therefore, by common cust-
om, compensation is mutually counted on in one case,
and in the other not."
Further on in the Opinion the reasoning is as follows:
"Every induction, inference, implication, or pre-
sumption in reasoning of any kind, is a logical con-
clusion derived from, and demanded by, certain data
or ascertained circumstances. If such circumstances
demand the conclusion of a contract to account for
them, a contract is proved; if not, not. If we find, as
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ascertained circumstances, that a stranger has been in
the employment of another, we immediately infer a
contract of hiring, because the principles of individual-
ity and self-interest, common to human nature, and
therefore the customs of society, require this inference.
But if we find a son in the employment of his
father, we do not infer a contract of hiring, because
the principle of family affection is sufficient to account
for the family association, and does not demand the in-
ference of a contract. And besides this, the position
of a son in a family is always esteemed better than
that of a hired servant, and it is very rare for sons
remaining in their father's family even after they arrive
at age, to become mere hired servants. If they do not
go to work or business on their own account, it is
generally because they percieve no sufficient induce-
ment to sever the family bond, and very often because
they lack the energy and independence necessary for
such a course; and very seldom because their father.
desires to use them as hired servants. Customarily no
charges are made for boarding and clothing and pocket-
money on one side, or for work on the other; but all
is placed to the account of filial and parental duty and
relationship."
In reversing the judgment and granting a new trial
the learned Justice concludes:
"The difficulty in trying causes of this kind often
arises from juries supposing that, because they have
the decision of the cause, therefore they may decide
according to general principles of honesty and fairness,
without reference to the law of the case. But this is
a despotic power, and is lodged with no portion of this
government.
Their verdict may, in fact, declare what is honest
between the parties, and yet it may be a mere usurpa-
tion of power, and thus be an effort to correct one evil
by a greater one. Citizens have a right to form con-
nexions on their own terms and to be judged accord-
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ingly. When parties claim by contract, the contract
proved must be the rule by which their rights are to
be decided. To judge them by any other rule is to
interfere with the liberty of the citizen."
In a rather obscure case, Prizer's Appeal, 3 Walker 487,
1882, there is a well considered opinion by Ross, P. J., of
the Orphans' Court of Montgomery County in which an
attempt is made to classify the various cases of service as
presented against the estate of decedent. The learned Court
remarks:
"That there is confusion, and, to some extent, con-
tradiction in the reported cases, grows out, not so much
from the law upon the subject, as it does from the find-
ings of fact in the various cases where that law was
expounded by the Court of last resort. * * * * Now the
conclusions reached by the Court, and which it reduces
to the form of propositions are those by which it means
to be guided in reaching the conclusions about to be
expressed upon the facts here.
FIRST. That in general, if one performs services
for another at his request, no designated compensation
being named, the person performing the services may
recover their value upon the implied promise to pay,
unless there be any fact or rules of law existing which
repel the presumption that the services were rendered
in expectation of compensation.
SECOND. That among those circumstances of
fact and rules of law, which operate to repel the pre-
sumption thus stated, are the want, as a matter of
fact, of a contract, either express or implied, and the
relationship of the parties in a degree which either
bars or tends to repel such presumption, under the law
as declared in Pennsylvania.
THIRD. That where services are rendered be-
tween parent and child, or those standing in loco par-
entis, there can be no recovery for services rendered by
either to the other, unless there be proof, direct and
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positive, of a contract to pay for such services, or
direct and positive proof of promise to pay. All other
degrees of consanguinity or affinity are circumstances
which tend to rebut the presumption, but such rela-
tionship does not, of itself, in the absence of direct and
positive evidence to the contrary, constitute an ab-
solute bar.
FOURTH. A family relation subsisting between
those of kindred blood, with services rendered by those
occupying that relation to each other, does not con-
stitute, in itself, an absolute bar to the recovery of
compensation for those services, if there be anything in
the attitude or relationship of the parties, or in the
declaration of the party receiving the benefits, which
rebuts the idea that the family relationship was the
consideration for the services solely, with no expecta-
tion of other remuneration.
FIFTH. Where, under such circumstances as
those last mentioned, services are rendered under the
expectation and belief that they will be rewarded by
testamentary benefits alone, there can be no recovery
where the decedent fails to meet such expectation,
either by devise or bequest. But if services are ac-
cepted by one holding a family relationship, who, while
receiving promises to pay for them without specifying
how, when or where, even although one performing
the service expected to be thus rewarded, no matter
what the relationship may have been (less than parent
and child, and possibly even then), a recovery may be
had upon such promise or promises as upon a quantum
meruit."
The general attitude toward claims of this character
against the estate of a decedent is definitely expressed in a
number of our Supreme Court cases.
In Harrington v. Hickman, 148 Pa. 401, 1892, Williams,
J. said:
"The frequency and facility with which unjust
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
claims have been presented and pressed against estates,
and the unequal character of the controversy, in which
one party is living and the other dead, have led the
courts to scrutinize the testimony in support of claims
against estates with great care."
In Gross's Estate, 284 Pa. 73, 1925, with thoughts upon
the same subject, Kephart, J., observed:
"The matter, as it thus presents itself, is resolved
into a contest against an estate by one who was in a
position to assert his rights long before the death of
the other party, at a time when there was sufficient
money on hand to pay it, and when the other party, the
one most interested, was in being to defend his rights.
To successfully assert a claim against a dead man's
estate is being steadily made more difficult. To estab-
lish such claim by parol evidence requires proof direct
and positive. The terms of the liability must be certain
and definite: CaldweIl v. Taylor, 276 Pa. 398, 404; Good-
hart's Est., 278 Pa. 381; Hirst's Est., 274 Pa. 286, 288;
Reynolds v. Wiliams, 282 Pa. 148. As we have often
said, 'These claims are always looked on with sus-
picion', the burden of proof lies on the claimant:
Heffner's Est., 134 Pa. 436, 444."
All of these cases necessarily fall into one or the other
of two classes, (a) where the claim is based upon an express
contract with the decedent, (b) where the claim is based
upon an implication of law or quantum mecruit.
EXPRESS CONTRACT
In Harrington v. Hickman, 148 Pa. 401, 1892, Plaintiff
brought assumpsit against defendants as Executors of
Joseph Pratt, deceased, to recover services at the rate of
$5.00 per week for nursing and taking care of defendants'
testator. The essential facts quoted from the record are
as follows:
"Joseph Pratt was an old man over eighty years
of age at the time of his death, and very feeble. In
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addition to the general infirmities of his age he suffer-
ed from disease of the bladder and kidneys, and in ad-
dition to this was very intemperate, and, as his phy-
sician testified, hard to manage and care for. The plain-
tiff was not related to him either by blood or marriage,
but was engaged by him as his housekeeper and nurse,
serving in this double capacity from July 15, 1883, to
December 1, 1886, when, her health becoming impaired,
she was obliged to leave, and Pratt employed two per-
sons, a housekeeper and a nurse, to perform the serv-
ices which she had formerly rendered. It was shown
that by a contract between them she was to receive
$1.00 per week. This she claimed was for her services
as housekeeper merely, and that by a distinct under-
standing she was to receive compensation for her ser-
vices as nurse from the executors of Pratt after his
decease. The testimony in support of plaintiff's con-
tention appears by the opinion of the Supreme Court.
At the conclusion of plaintiff's case, the court on
motion of defendants, entered a compulsory nonsuit,
and subsequently refused to take it off. Plaintiff ap-
pealed."
Plaintiff in support of her position, proved by a dis-
interested witness the declaration of decedent "Betsy is
very kind to me. I have promised her that she shall be
paid by my executors when I am gone for waiting on me."
There was no question about the worth of the services. The
Supreme Court held that the above declaration was com-
petent evidence upon the question of the existence of the
contract sued on, and was clear, direct and sufficient if be-
lieved, to justify a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
In this case the plaintiff relied upon an express con-
tract and the decision of the Court was, that with the evi-
dence submitted, a prima facie case had been established.
The motion for non-suit should not have been granted and
the burden of coming forward with evidence and dislodging
the prima facie case was upon the defendants and ultimately
the entire question would have gone to the jury for its
determination on the facts.
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In Mack's Estate, 278 Pa. 426, 1924, a claim was made
by a daughter against her deceased father's estate- for serv-
ices as nurse and housekeeper, founded upon the express
promise of the father to pay her a sum equal to that paid
a skilled n'urse if she would take care of the home, her
father, and the minor children living therein. In passing
upon the case Sadler, J., said:
"It is necessary to consider whether the testimony
here offered justified the findings made. The daughter,
Julia, had been a student in a hospital, preparing her-
self as a professional nurse, and was so engaged for
two and one-half years prior to the death of her
mother. She abandoned this vocation at the request
of her father, under an alleged promise of payment of
a sum equal that paid a skilled nurse, if she would re-
turn to the family home and take care of it, her father,
and the minor children living therein. That she was
competent to perform the work for which she had been
trained, and was frequently requested to assist others
professionally while with her father, appears by the
testimony of several disinterested witnesses. Such
services were in demand during the period covered by
the present claim at a minimum rate of twenty-five
dollars per week, a higher sum being named by several.
Sister Seton and Doctor Jackson both testified as to
endeavoring to secure the aid of Julia as a trained
nurse, and of being told by the decedent that he would
not permit her to undertake any -outside work since
'he would pay her as much or more than she could
earn, and under no circumstances would he permit her
to go', and that 'she should remain at home and he
would pay her the equal to what she would receive
nursing'.
"Other witnesses were called who told of state-
ments made by the father, disclosing the existence of
an understanding on his part to pay at the rate which
could have been earned by the daughter had she fol-
lowed her profession. These declarations were made
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on numerous occasions in the presence of the various
members of the family, including the claimant. Frank
Mack and Fred P. Mack, her brothers, Sarah Hicks, a
sister, and Mrs. Barbara Hicks, apparently a disinter-
ested third party, all testified as to the promise made by
the decedent, and no opposing evidence was offered on
behalf of the residuary legatee. After a careful read-
ing of the record, we are convinced that the claimant
met the quantum of proof required in such cases; that
she did perform the services at the request of her
father, under an express promise to pay therefore the
sum customarily paid for a trained nurse in the com-
munity, and that this amount was not less than twenty-
five dollars per week. The auditor, as found by the
court below, correctly so held."
In Brose's Estate, 155 Pa. 619, 1893, a claim was pre-
sented against the estate for boarding and washing and for
nursing decedent based upon evidence showing an express
contract by which claimant agreed to furnish board and
washing for $50.00 per year. The Court made an allowance
for nursing and for funeral expenses but disallowed an
additional amount claimed for boarding and washing and
taking care of the decedent over and above the amount of
$50.00 per year as expressly agreed upon. In affirming the
decree and dismissing the appeal the Supreme Court, per
Curiam, said:
"We have no doubt 'the appellant has been inade-
quately compensated for the boarding, washing and
taking care of the deceased, but that is the result of
his own improvident contract. That contract appears
to have been clearly established; and, of course, it stood
in the way of such additional allowance as he otherwise
would have been entitled to."
IMPLIED CONTRACT
All liability enforced under our system of law by ac-
tions in assumpsit is based upon promises made or supposed
to have been made in contract, The promise may be clear
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by the evidence, in which case it is called express, or it
may be shown by circumstances, when it is called implied
in fact. The usual doctrine is that one is not bound unless
he has made a valid promise either expressly or by fair
implication. In Anderson v. Hamilton Township, 25 Pa. 75,
1855, Knox, J., explains the lack of liability in these words:
"A voluntary act, although beneficial to another,
performed without request, affords no legal cause of
action for compensation."
On the other hand the law frequently implies a promise
where there never was one and permits a recovery for
services rendered. However, such a claimant must show
three facts, (1) a request of the plaintiff by the defendant
for the services, (2) a rendition by the plaintiff of beneficial
services to the defendant, and (3) acceptance by the de-
fendant of such services.
In Miller's Appeal, 100 Pa. 568, 1882, Trunkey, J. de-
clares:
"Implied contracts are such as reason and justice
dictate, and which the law presumes from the relations
and circumstances of the parties. Nothing is better
settled than that the performance and receipt of serv-
ices, or the furnishing of board, raises an implied as-
sumpsit by the one who receives to compensate the
other, yet this implication- may be rebutted by proof of
facts which repel- the idea of a contract."
The facts which may be submitted in proof to repel
the idea of a contract are numerous but, assuming that
services were actually performed, they all depend upon
whether a request was made or there was an acceptance
of the services under circumstances which would justify
an expectation on the part of the claimant that he was
to be paid.
Certain situations have occurred so frequently in the
cases that the Courts have laid down certain strict infer-
ences or presumptions concerning them.
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It has been repeatedly held that services performed by
a child for a parent or a parent for a child are presumed to
be gratuitous and prima facie there can be no recovery un-
less an express contract or promise to pay be shown or
circumstances so direct and strong, direct and positive,
clear and distinct be shown. In Miller's Appeal, supra,
Trunkey, J., thus explained:
"Between parent and child the rule is, that there
can be no recovery for service, boarding, or the like, in
the absence of an express contract to pay therefor. The
degree of proof to establish it cannot be the same in.
all cases. Nor is a contract for the payment of money
for services or goods, subject to the same rules respect-
ing its proof as are applied to oral contracts for the
conveyance or devise of land by a father to his son,
as was the case in Harris v. Richey, 56 Pa. St. 395.
When a son continues in his father's family and service
after his majority, as before, he cannot recover wages,
unless there be direct, clear and positive proof of an
express contract. But there it has not been held es-
sential that a witness was present with the parties face
to face and heard their bargain. However, the circum-
stances require much stronger proof to establish a con-
tract, than when the son had left his father's home,
had done business for himself for years, and the father
requested his return, care and service. In one case
the circumstances are opposed to the idea of a con-
tract; in the other they are corroborative of the father's
declarations to third persons that he promised his son
to pay him.
"The question always is, whether the parties con-
templated payment and dealt with each other as debtor
and creditor. A son who takes his decrepit parents into
his house and supports them, is presumed to do so from
the promptings of natural affection; no contract is
implied. But if the father, before they go and after-
ward, repeatedly declares that he was to pay for their
board such declarations are evidence, and with the cir-
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
cumstances may be so direct and strong as to compel
belief that he expressly agreed to pay for it. Loose
declarations made to the son or others will not answer.
That which may be only the expression of an inten-
tion to compensate is not evidence of an agreement to
compensate. If he intended to pay and often said so
to others, he was not bound. It must appear that he
purposed to assume a legal obligation, capable of being
enforced against him."
On the other hand in Gibb's Estate, 266 Pa. 485, 1920,
Frazer, J. observed:
"Relationship alone, however, is sufficient to over-
come the presumption only in the case of parent and
child: Smith v. Milligan, 43 Pa. 107; Miller's App., supra.
In other cases the burden is on the person denying
liability to show no debt was, in fact, intended. It has
been held that no presumption of family relationship
existed where the claim was by a son-in-law against
his father-in-law for board; Perkins v. Hasbrouck,
Admr., 155 Pa. 494; or by a son-in-law against his
mother-in-law's estate; Gerz's Exr. v. Demarra's Exr.,
162 Pa. 530; or by a niece of a decedent's wife; Ran-
ninger's App., 118 Pa. 120; or where the relationship is
that of brother-in-law and sister-in-law; Caskey v.
Kineavy, 60 Pa. Superior Ct. 87. The closer the re-
lationship the less expectation of payment, and greater
strictness of proof to overcome the presumption is re-
quired: Miller's App., supra."
However, the family relationship may be established
and shown between.parties who are not related by ties of
blood and if as a fact claimant and decedent maintained
a common household the presumption against an expecta-
tion of compensation for services rendered arises. This
was the situation in Brown v. McCurdy, 278 Pa. 19, 1923,
wherein Sadler, J. commented:
"Claimant came to the home of her mother-in-law
at the solicitation of her husband, and remained there
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as a member of the family until his death in 1903. As
already stated, there is no suggestion she was to be
paid for any service to be rendered during that period;
on the contrary, she was treated as a part of the house-
hold, and this relationship existed until the death of
Mrs. Brown. A presumption arises that the associa-
tion, which began in 1902, continued, and unless it could
be found from the testimony offered that there had
been a change, we must assume that it was unaltered.
It has been said, an intention to pay for work done will
be assumed, except in the case of parent and child.
Where, however, it is apparent that the parties, though
not so related by blood, in reality bore like connection
to each other, the implication does not arise. Under
such circumstances it is necessary before a judgment
can be had, that there be proof of an express contract,
which must be clearly shown: Ulrich v. Arnold, 120 Pa.
170; Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 129 Pa. 229. The mere
fact that the claimant was a daughter-in-law of the
decedent raises no presumption of gratuitous service
(Schoch v. Garrett, 69 Pa. 144; Gerz v. Demarra's Exrs.,
162 Pa. 530; Gibb's Est. 266 Pa. 485) but if, as here, the
claimant has become a part of the family, the contrary
is true."
In Collin's Estate, 83 Pa. Super. Ct. 31, 1924, the claim-
ant was the wife of a nephew of the decedent. Claimant
and her husband went to live with the decedent and to-
gether a home was established for herself, her husband,
her daughter, and the decedent. The latter was nursed and
taken good care of by the claimant. These facts were
deemed sufficient to establish the family relationship and
preclude a recovery by claimant for services rendered de-
cedent as housekeeper and nurse during the last seventeen
and one-half months of the life of decedent. Under such
circumstances it is necessary for recovery that there be
proof of an express contract to pay.
On the other hand in Kerr v. Wilson, 284 Pa. 541, 1925,
a claimant who was a nephew of the decedent was allowed
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to recover for services where it was shown that the uncle
sought a home in the house of his nephew so that he might
have someone to care for him in his old age. Frazer, J.
placed the case in the same category with Gibb's Estate,
holding that the uncle was the sole beneficiary of the ar-
rangement and furthermore finding that there was evidence
sufficient from which the jury could properly find an ex-
press promise to pay for the services.
It is noteworthy that in both the latter case and its
predecessor, Gibb's Estate, supra, the Court found sufficient
evidence of an express contract.
It has been held several times that a son-in-law cannot
recover for care, nursing and personal services rendered a
mother-in-law where the latter lived in the family of
the former without paying or agreeing to pay for her board
and keep and without any demand upon her therefor:
Young's Estate, 148 Pa. 573, 1892; Gerz v. Weber, 151 Pa.
396, 1892.
The term family relationship as used in discussing the
'legal rights as claimants of children against parents or
parents against children denotes primarily the near kinship
and not necessarily the habitation together in a dwelling
or under one head as a common household. However, in
discussing the respective rights and liabilities of all other
persons actually related by affinity or consanguinity or not
the test is the actual living together as one family or com-
mon household. As already indicated where a family re-
lationship is already established the nearer the actual re-
lationship by blood or marriage the weaker is the inference
that compensation for services was expected.
A lived with her sister B at intervals, for years. The
evidence went to show that A's position in the household
was that of a member of the family. During all the time
of occupancy no board was asked for or paid. A assisted
in the family work, and occasionally advanced B small
sums, of which no account was kept. A died, and B filed
a claim against her estate for board. The claim was dis-
allowed, and B appealed. Decree affirmed-Culp's Appeal,
28 L..I. 60, 1871, Thompson, C. J.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
In the article referred to, by Professor Reese, the learn-
ed writer observed:
"A careful distinction must also be made between
expectation of pay and disappointed expectations. In
the former case the plaintiff performs services bene-
ficial to the defendant and expects compensation there-
for in some form or other. In the latter case the
plaintiff does not expect pay for his services but expects
that because of his services gratuitously rendered, his
donee will reciprocate his generosity or indirectly re-
ward him. In such cases there can be no recovery."
In Gilbraith's Estate, 270 Pa. 288, 1921, Simpson, J. closes
an opinion with these words:
"So far as any conclusion can be drawn from the
statements quoted, it would be the witnesses thought
claimant's services were to be recompensed by a leg-
acy, and not otherwise; and the case, in this aspect, is
within the rule that where services are rendered in
expectation of a legacy to be given, there can be no
recovery against a decedent's estate, for this excludes
the idea of a contractual relation between the parties:
Miller's Est., 136 Pa. 239, 250; Cummiskey's Est., 224
Pa. 509, 513."
However, where a contract was made by a decedent in
her life time to devise a house to the claimant in considera-
tion of services to be performed for decedent until the
latter's death a recovery was allowed-Conkle v. Byers'
Exr., 282 Pa. 375, 1925. Said Walling, J.:
"The testimony of Mrs. Crawford, however, if
credited, and that was for the jury (Eichelberger's Est.,
170 Pa. 242; Gerz's Exrs. v. Demarra's Exr., 162 Pa. 530;
McDonald v. Eiler, 81 Pa. Superior Ct. 172), established
the existence of such a contract as entitled plaintiff
to recover the value of her services rendered on the
faith thereof, the house not having been given her; and
it is immaterial whether the contract was made before
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or while the services were being performed: Currey's
Est., 26 Pa. Superior Ct. 479."
A legacy may be left by a testatrix with the intention
to fulfill some declarations made relative to compensation
for services. In Hughes v. Keichline, 168 Pa. 115, 1895, an
action in assumpsit was brought against a decedent's estate
for services wherein the plaintiff relied upon declarations of
the deceased that the services were to be paid for. It was
held that the will of testatrix showing a legacy to the
plaintiff was admissible in evidence and it was for the jury
to determine what effect should be given it.
PERIODICAL PAYMENTS
The doctrine of periodical payments affects a great
number of the cases now under consideration. It has been
shown heretofore that in the case of parent and child any
services performed one for the other are presumed to have
been done out of kindness and family affection and not for
a monetary consideration.
A presumption is said to be in inference as to the exist-
ence of one fact not certainly known from the existence of
some other fact known or proved founded on a previous
experience of their connection. Ordinary observance dis-
closes that parents and children usually act from motives
of filial affection and love and hence the presumption. This
throws the burden upon a claimant to dislodge the pre-
sumption by direct evidence.
In the case of periodical payments there is encountered
another presumption which again throws the burden of dis-
lodging it upon the claimant. In McConnell's Appeal, 97 Pa.
31, 1881, Paxson, J. explained:
"It was held, in Gough v. Findon, 7 Exch. 49, that
'where a person serves in the capacity of a domestic
servant, and no demand for payment of wages is made
by the servant for a considerable period after such
service has terminated, the inference is, either that the
wages have been paid, or that the service was perform-
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ed on the footing that no payment was to be made.'
Again in Sellen v. Norman, 4 C. & P. 80, it was said by
Gazalee, J.: 'In the regular course, if the servant has
left a considerable time, the presumption is, that all
the wages have been paid.' * * * *
"The presumption referred to in the cases cited
rests upon the known fact, that in England servants'
wages, as a general rule, are paid at stated periods, and
it is entirely immaterial whether such periods are week-
ly, monthly or yearly, and upon the further fact that
a servant rarely leaves the service of an employer, and
remains away for months or years, without a settle-
ment of some sort with his or her employer, or at least
a demand for payment. The same facts exist in this
country, and there is, therefore, the same presumption.
In either case it is a presumption which the law raises
from a known state of facts, and a known course of
dealing. It is, however, a presumption of fact merely,
and liable to l6e rebutted."
In Mack's Estate, 278 Pa. 426, 1924, Sadler, J. points
out the application of this presumption to the line of cases
now under consideration. Said the learned Justice:
"One other objection is made to the award in the
present case. Where labor of a domestic character or
nursing has been rendered, there is a presumption that
payment for it was given at stated periods (Gilbraith's
Est., 270 Pa. 288; Cummiskey's Est., 224 Pa. 509; Flaccus
v. Wood, 260 Pa. 161) a rule not applying to services
of a different kind; Gibb's Est., 266 Pa. 485. Here the
claimant came within the class-to which the presump-
tion is applicable, and the burden was upon her to over-
come the legal conclusion which follows. It was for
the court to say, under the circumstances, whether this
had been done: Richards v., Walp, 221 Pa. 412. Sarah
Hicks, a daughter, residing in the same house, testified
positively that no payment on behalf of the services
was ever made by the decedent,-and, though appellant
reserved the right to cross-examine, counsel failed to
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take advantage of the opportunity to do so. Further
questioning might have weakened the strength of this
statement, as Was true of the testimony of Frank
Mack, but no effort was made to show that compensa-
tion could have been given without the knowledge of
the witness. It is also to be noticed that in the evi-
dence of all who repeated declarations of the decedent,
the time of payment is indicated as in the future and
not the present."
In the case just referred to the claim was by a daughter
against her deceased father's estate for services as nurse
and housekeeper.
In Gilbraith's Estate, 270 Pa. 288, 1921, the claim was
for boarding and nursing decedent. One of the questions
was as to the application of the presumption of periodical
payments. Said Simpson, J.:
"Moreover, in Cumnmiskey's Est., 224 Pa. 509, this
exact question was in issue, was argued at length and
we there said, 'It is the habit and usage of people to pay
their board bills as well as for services for nursing, at
stated periods. This is so well understood in this
country that, as in the case of servants' wages, a pre-
sumption arises that they are periodically paid'; and
this conclusion is not overruled by Gibb's Est., 266 Pa.
485, but, on the contrary, is expressly recognized, for
there the rule was held not to apply solely because 'the
relations between aunt and nephew were of such pe-
culiar and exceptional character (he being treated as
a member of the. family) that the presumption of pay-
ment arising in the ordinary case of services rendered
is not applicable.' In the present instance, however,
there was no relationship, and hence the usual rule
obtains. Moreover, the applicability of the custom is
expressly recognized here, for appellant claims to be
paid at such much a week; and the witnesses, as to
the value of her.services, testified they are usuaUy
recompensed at a given rate each week."
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In Collins' Estate, 83 Pa. Super. Ct. 31, 1924, the claimant
was the wife of a nephew of decedent and the claim was
for services rendered decedent as housekeeper and nurse
during the last seventeen and one-half months of the life
of decedent. In reversing the decree of the lower Court
allowing the claim, Porter J. reasoned that if a family
relationship was maintained between claimant and decedent
then it was incumbent upon claimant to establish an express
contract to pay for the services and there was no evidence
adduced warranting a finding that there was such a con-
tract. Said the learned Judge:
"If, on the other hand, the family relation did not
exist, a presumption arose that the compensation, even
if any was contemplated, had been turned over at
stated periods, and this presumption cannot be over-
come by vague and uncertain testimony, concerning
loose declarations of a decedent of an intention to
generously reward those about him: Brown v. McCurdy,
supra; Gilbraith's Estate, 270 Pa. 288; Flaccus v. Wood,
260 Pa. 161; Cummiskey's Est., 224 Pa. 509; Wise v.
Martin, 232 Pa. 159. This presumption is in the present
case strengthened by the fact that the decedent was a
woman who had cash available for her needs."
In Gibb's Estate, 266 Pa. 485, 1920, a claim for board,
lodging and washing was allowed an aunt against the
estate of her deceased nephew. A family relationship was
shown, the nephew making his home with his aunt for
eight or nine years prior to his death and was treated as a
member of the family. However, evidence was submitted
from which a recognition of obligation by the decedent
might be inferred and there was also proof of a credit on
account. Said Frazer, J.:
"While the testimony is meager, it is not denied
that the services were rendered, and we cannot say
that the court below erred in concluding the proof
offered on the part of the estate was insufficient to
rebut the presumption of intention to pay for such
services.
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"Appellant further contended that if a contract to
pay board existed, the law presumes payment at reg-
ular intervals ahd claimant failed to produce sufficient
proof to overcome this presumption of periodical pay-
ments as in cases of claims for domestic services. The
claimant did not occupy the position of a servant; on
the contrary, the relations between aunt and nephew
were of such peculiar and exceptional character that
the presumption of payment arising in the ordinary
case of services rendered is not applicable: Ranninger's
App., supra; Lewis's Est., 156 Pa. 337. There is evi-
dence that deceased, during the last year of his life,
admitted he had not paid board and we fail to find any
evidence on the part of the estate to prove a payment
of any portion of the claim, with the exception of the
small sum admitted by claimant."
In Kerr v. Wilson, 284 Pa. 541, 1925,, an action in as-
sumpsit for services against the estate of a decedent was
brought by plaintiffs who were husband and wife against
the estate of a deceased uncle of the husband. The facts
were that eleven years before the decedent's death at a time
when he was past 75 years of age he went to reside with his
nephew and continued to make his home there until his
death. Eight years before his death he suffered a stroke
which resulted in partial paralysis and from which he never
fully recovered, his physical condition thereafter making
it necessary for him to receive constant attention. His
condition grew gradually worse and three months before
his death he became entirely helpless requiring attention
both day and night. These services were performed en-
tirely by the plaintiffs. The claim was for board and nurs-
ing during the period of 6 years immediately preceding
decedent's death. In affirming the judgment for the plain-
tiff by the lower Court, Frazer, J. pointed out that the
decedent sought a home and someone to take care of him
in his old age and was the sole beneficiary under the mu-
tual arrangements between him and his nephew and fur-
ther that there was evidence from which the jury could
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properly find an express promise to pay for the services.
Consequently, the presumption of periodical payments
would not apply to such facts and the case was similar
to that of Gibb's Estate, supra.
It will be observed that both the Gibb's case and that of
Kerr v. Wilson are clearly distinguishable from others dis-
cussed by the fact that that the presumptions of gratuity
and periodical payment were rebutted by satisfactory evi-
dence of the express recognition by decedent of the obliga-
tion to pay thus justifying the expectation of payment upon
the part of claimants.
See also Schleich's Estate, 286 Pa. 578, 1926, per
Frazer, J.
In Witten v. Stout, 284 Pa. 410, 1925, the widow of a
nephew of decedent brought assumpsit against the estate
for services rendered. There was a non-suit and an appeal
from the refusal by the lower court to take off the non-
suit. Relative to periodical payments Moschzisker, C. J.
said:
"Plaintiff also failed to surmount another obstacle
to recovery; services of the character performed by
her, domestic labor and nursing, are customarily com-
pensated for at stated periods, as rendered, and, when
a claim of the nature of the one before us is presented,
there is a strong presumption that the services were
so paid for. Taylor v. Beatty, 202 Pa. 120; Cummiskey's
Est., 224 Pa. 509; Winfield v. Beaver Trust Co., 229 Pa.
530, 532; Peiffer's Estate, 261 Pa. 209; Gilbrait's Est.,
270 Pa. 288. The burden is on the claimant to overcome
the presumption of payment; Winfield v. Beaver Trust
Co., supra; Cummiskey's Est., supra. Here, no direct
proof was offered to rebut the presumption of pay-
ment; the loose declarations of decedent, depended on
by plaintiff for that purpose, were insufficient,-af-
firmative proof was necessary; Winfield v. Beaver Trust
Co., supra; Gilbraith's Est., supra. Whether the proofs
measure up to the required standard is primarily a
question for the Court; Richards v. Walp, 221 Pa. 412;
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in the present instance, the evidence relied on by plain-
tiff was inadequate from every point of view."
In Cummiskey's Est., 224 Pa. 509, 1909, Mestrezat, J.
observed:
"It is the habit and usage of people to pay their
board bills as well as for services for nursing at stated
periods. This is so well understood in this country,
that, as in the case of servants' wages, a presumption
arises that they are periodically paid. Especially does
this rule obtain when a claim for boarding and nursing
for years is presented against the estate of a decedent.
The protection of the estates of the dead requires its
rigid enforcement."
In Lewis's Estate, 156 Pa. 337, 1893, in order to avoid
the presumption as to periodic payments a distinction is
drawn between services rendered by a married woman to a
boarder in cleaning his room and administering medicine
to him when sick from that of the services of an ordinary
house servant. In Gibb's Estate, supra, there is a similar
attempted distinction and it is likewise adverted to in
Mack's Estate, 278 Pa. 426, 1924. However, the general
trend of the decisions appears to be on this point in accord
with the quotation just made from Cummiskey's Estate, and
the distinction as made in the other cases was a minor one
and not essential to the determination of the issue.
However, in Beaver's Estate, 76 Pa. Super. Ct. 354, 192t
it is held that services performed by one who had attended
the decedent during his last illness were not those of an
ordinary house servant and, therefore, did not come within
the rule that such services are presumed to be paid for
within fixed periods. This simply means, apparently, that
the periodic payment rule obviously could not apply to serv-
ices performed to a decedent in the last illness and it is
submitted that the reason should not be any distinction be-




Under our procedure one who holds a claim against a
decedent may elect either to bring assumpsit in Common
Pleas against the executors or administrators of the de-
cedent or the claim may be presented in the Orphans' Court
and acted upon by an auditing Judge or an Auditor specially
appointed by the Orphans' Court to adjudicate claims
against the estate of the decedent. Many illustrations of
actions in assumpsit are found in the reports, i. e., Har-
rington v. Hickman, 148 Pa. 401, 1892 and Conkel v. Byers'
Ext., 282 Pa. 375, 1925.
On the other hand illustrations of procedure in the
Orphans' Courts are found in Gibb's Estate, 266 Pa. 485,
1920; Gilbraith's Estate, 270 Pa. 288, 1921 and Mack's Estate,
279 Pa. 426, 1924.
If a claimant files an action in the Common Pleas and
thereafter, without bringing the case to trial, presents his
claim to an Auditor appointed by the Orphans' Court, he
cannot, after the Auditor has disallowed his claim, ask to
have an issue framed so that his case may be tried before
a jury.
In Schwoyer's Estate, 288 Pa. 541, 1927, Walling, J.
opined:
"After the auditor had filed his report, claimant
asked to have an issue framed so his case might be
tried before a jury. This was properly denied; having
had his day in court before the auditor he was not
entitled to another before a jury. The application came
too late. A creditor whose claim has been passed
upon, is concluded: Sergeant's Executors v. Ewing, 30
Pa. 75; Reading Tr. Co. v. Penna. Tr. Co., 26 Pa. Superior
Ct. 599."
If a claimant declares in assumpsit against the estate
of a decedent upon an express contract for compensation
for services rendered he cannot, without amending the
statement, recover on a quantum meruit basis. Said Mos-
chzisker, C. J. in Witten v. Stout, 284 Pa. 410, 1925:
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"Unless by amendment or otherwise, there is a
clear averment in the statement of claim showing a
plain intention to plant plaintiff's case on a pure
quantum meruit basis, the rule (correctly set forth by
Judge Landis in Wolf v. Yeager's Exrs., 20 Lancaster L.
Rev. 67) controls, that, where one claims on an express
contract to pay a fixed compensation, he cannot on
failure to prove the contract, entitle himself to recover
by proving simply the value of services rendered, with-
out showing an actual promise to pay."
EVIDENCE ACT OF 1887, P. L. 158
In Swieczkowski v. Sypniewski, Exr., 294 Pa. at page
327, 1928, Schaffer, J., declared.
"The Evidence Act of May 23, P. L. 158, section 5,
clause (e), provides 'Nor where any party to a thing
or contract in action is dead * * * * and his right thereto
or therein has passed either by his own act or by the
act of the law, to a party on the record, who represents
his interest in the subject in controversy, shall any
surviving or remaining party to such thing or con-
tract * * * * be a competent witness to any matters
occurring before the death of said party'. This section
of the act applies not only to transactions with a de-
ceased party to the thing or contract in action, but to
testimony as to any fact occurring before his death:
Sutherland v. Ross, 140. Pa. 379. That an interested
party is generally incompetent for all purposes is ac-
cepted without discussion in Crothers v. Crothers, 149
Pa. 201; Baldwin v. Stier, 191 Pa. 432; Reap v. Dougher,
261 Pa. 23; Sheaffer v. Brown, 281 Pa. 114. Notwith-
standing this provision of the statute, plaintiff was per-
mitted to testify over appellant's objection as to the
servants her uncle employed during the time she work-
ed for him, and what they did and did not do, to the
lack of servants, to services she rendered to the child-
ren, to services performed for her uncle in connection
with his medical practice, to the purchases she made
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for the household and for the children, to the money
she received from the decedent to pay for them, to
account books she kept and that she showed to her
uncle, that she gave the account books to him, to the
cooking she did, the laundry work, sewing and scrub-
bing, to her care of the children and of her uncle when
sick, to her management of some of his business, the
length of her hours of employment and the expend-
itures she made from the moneys he gave her, the
latter to negative the idea that she received any of it
for herself. All of these things were 'matters occur-
ring before the death' of her uncle. About them she
was forbidden to testify by the express terms of the
act; to permit her to so testify was manifest error:
Phillips' Est., 271 Pa. 129; Campbell's Est., 274 Pa. 546,
551, and cases cited. Plaintiff was not only a surviv-
ing and remaining party to the contract in action, but
she had an interest adverse to the right of the decedent:
Edmundson's Est., 259 Pa. 429, 436."
If, howevei, the witness has a pecuniary interest in
the estate he is not thereby rendered incompetent to testify
against a claim presented. His interest is not adverse but
is in favor of' the estate. Gerz v. Weber, 151 Pa. 396, 1892.
Further cases in support of the latter proposition are:
Brose's Estate, 155 Pa. 619, 1893; Taylor's Estate, 12 Phila.
137, 1878; Crosetti's Estate, 211 Pa. 490, 1905. See generally
Title 28, Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes Annotated.
In Munson v. Crookston, 219 Pa. 419, 1908, there was
an ejectment suit wherein the plaintiffs claimed under the
will of a decedent whereas the defendent, the husband f
the deceased, claimed possession as tenant by curtesy, hav-
ing elected to take against his wife's will, it was said:
"The husband here claimed by devolution of law,
that is, as tenant by the curtesy, an estate by descent,
Cooke v. Doron, 215 Pa. 393, while the plaintiff claimed
under the wife's will, that is, by purchase. He there-
fore stood in her place, and the husband's claim was
adverse to her title which the plaintiff represented. Had
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the plaintiff claimed as heir or next of kin he would
have been a competent witness under the exception
quoted. But as the case stands, their claims are of
different classes, and they are not within the exception
of the statute: Rine v. Hall, 187 Pa. 264, 276; King v.
Humphreys, 138 Pa. 310; Crothers v. Crothers, 149 Pa.
201; Baldwin v. Stier, 191 Pa. 432; Myers v. Little, 195
Pa. 595; Shroyer v. Smith, 204 Pa. 310."
In reference to the incompetency of witnesses whose
interest is adverse to that of a decedent, Trickett on Penn-
sylvania Law of Witnesses at page 173 says:
"The persons mentioned as incompetent, by clause
(e) of the 5th section of the act of 1887 are described
as 'any surviving or remaining party to such thing or
contract, or any other person whose interest shall be
adverse to the said right of such deceased or lunatic
party.' There are then, two classes of incompetents:
(a) surviving or remaining parties to the thing or con-
tract, whose interest shall be adverse to the deceased
or lunatic party; (b) any other person whose interest
shall be thus adverse. Better, there is only one class of
persons who are incompetent, those whose interest is
adverse to the right of the deceased or lunatic party,
and this class may be composed either of the surviving
or remaining party to the thing or contract, or of
persons not party thereto."
In Roach's Estate, 30 D. R. 57, 1921, Gest, J. of the
Orphans' Court of Philadelphia County, referring to the
incompetency of a claimant to testify against the estate of
the decedent said:
"It was conceded that the claimant could not
testify as tct her transactions with the decedent, but
she was virtually offered as an expert to testify to the
value of services performed. The Evidence Act of May
23, 1887, Sec. 5, P. L. 158, Purd. 1497-98, however rend-
ered the claimant incompetent to testify as to 'any
matter occurring before the death' of the deceased
party, not merely as to transactions with her. The
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question is ruled by the plain language of the act of
assembly aid does not merit discussion."
As has been noted, the Act in addition to specifying
a surviving party "to such thing or contract" also follows
with this description:
"Or any other person whose interest shall be ad-
verse to the said right of such deceased or lunatic
party."
Suppose A dies and B and C present claims for services
alleged to have been rendered A at about the same time
and under similar circumstances and conditions. Will B
be competent to testify as to the facts and circumstances
concerning C's claim and on the other hand will C be
competent to testify to the facts and circumstances con-
cerning B's claim?
No case as reported has been found or called to the
writer's attention covering this precise question but in the
Estate of Annie E. Doyle in Volume T, Auditors Reports, page
50 of the Orphans' Court Records of Franklin County, and
under date of July 3, 1929, Judge Davidson ruled that the
two witnesses would be competent, not to testify in respect
to his own claim but in support of the claims of each other,
it being the duty of the Auditor hearing the testimony to
eliminate from such testimony all facts which would sup-
port the particular witness's claim when that matter was
being considered but admitting the testimony, as has been
stated, in support of the claimant for whom the witness was
testifying.
BURDEN OF PROOF
Burden of proof is a phrase used by the Courts in a
dual sense and frequently without explanation. The pri-
mary meaning of this expression is the burden of establish-
ing the issue. This burden is always upon a plaintiff or
claimant and never shifts. A secondary meaning, however,
is the burden of coming forward with evidence. In the
latter sense the burden of proof frequently shifts. At the
outstart of a case both burdens are upon the plaintiff or
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claimant but upon the establishment of a prinma facie case
by evidence and the aid of certain presumptions, the burden
of dislodging the prima facie case will shift from a plaintiff
or claimant to the defendant or those defending the estate
in an Orphans' Court proceeding.
On the contrary we have seen that a claimant may
fail because of his inability to dislodge by proper evidence
the presumptions arising from family relationship and thc
rule of periodical payments.
Furthermore, there runs through all these cases quite
a marked trend indicating upon the part of our courts an
unsympathetic attitude toward the class of claims now
under consideration. In the citations and quotations al-
ready made it is said that the Courts scrutinize the testi-
mony in support of claims against estates with great care,
especially in view of the fact that the one most interested
is no longer in being to defend his rights. If there is no
relationship by affinity or consanguinity between the claim-
ant and the decedent the ban of suspicion on the part of
the Courts is not so pronounced but with relationship the
suspicion is intensified and increases in the degree of in-
tensity with the nearness of relationship, until we come
to the point of parent and child when the Courts insist upon
evidence of an express contract.
As already indicated every claimant must show three
facts. (1) a request for the services, (2) a rendition of bene-
ficial services, and (3) acceptance of the services. In cases
of strangers as claimants, slight actual evidence of the first
and third requirements will suffice provided there is reason-
ably strong evidence of the second requirement. In the
case of parent and child the three requirements may suffi-
ciently appear by evidence and yet the claimant will fail
because he has not shown an express contract. Between
these two extreme cases the decisions vary according to the
particular circumstances, no express contract being re-
quired but the facts of request and acceptance established
by evidence sufficiently clear to lift the ban of suspicion
as maintained by the Courts.
Chambersburg, Pa. A. J. WHITE HUTTON
